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Introduction 
Under the United States legal system, ordinary people are regularly charged with the task 
of determining the future of their peers by way of a jury trial. These jurors, “who lack legal 
training,” must, “make sense of conflicting facts, and apply legal rules to reach a verdict” 
(Bornstein and Greene 63). Due to this overall lack of legal training, the ability of jurors to make 
such crucial decisions, especially in criminal trials, is often questioned. Many even argue that 
judges, who have received a formal legal education as well as extensive training, should have the 
final word on court rulings. Although it is unrealistic to provide the entire American population 
of potential jurors with legal preparation, we can begin to ensure that decisions are being made in 
a fair and accurate manor by uncovering how jurors make decisions while participating in a jury 
trial.  
Along with reaching a verdict, a multitude of decisions must be made by a juror 
throughout a trial. This setting presents an ideal situation to explore and implement the 
framework of the elaboration likelihood model (ELM) of persuasion. Developed primarily by 
Richard Petty and John Cacioppo, ELM is based on the idea that, depending on a number of 
factors, such as motivation and ability to evaluate the communication presented, receivers of 
information will differ in the degree to which they are likely to engage in elaborative thinking 
(Petty and Cacioppo 129). Further, “under conditions of relatively low elaboration…persuasive 
effects will be much more influenced by the receiver’s use of simple decision rules or heuristic 
principles. These heuristic principles (or heuristics, for short) represent simple decision 
procedures requiring little information processing” (O’Keefe 148). Examples of heuristics 
include deciding to side with a speaker’s advocated position simply because you like them as a 
person, or believing that an item is of higher quality because it is priced higher. The nature of a 
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jury presents a probable situation for heuristic based decision-making, as jurors often have little 
prior knowledge on the subject at hand, and will thus be likely to engage in low elaboration. 
Prior knowledge plays a key role in influencing elaboration, as the more extensive the receiver’s 
prior knowledge on the topic, “the better able the receiver is to engage in issue-relevant thinking” 
(O’Keefe 144). Additionally, as more issue-relevant thinking occurs, “the influence of argument 
strength on persuasive effects increases, and the influence of peripheral cues decreases,” 
allowing for a more informed and correct decision to be made (O’Keefe 144). 
Petty and Cacioppo further break down this process by presenting the central and 
peripheral routes to persuasion, and explaining that the amount of elaboration that occurs when 
one is presented with a given subject will determine how the persuasion process will function. 
The central route of persuasion occurs when, “motivation and ability to scrutinize issue-relevant 
arguments are relatively high” (Petty and Cacioppo 131). Conversely, persuasion can also occur 
through the peripheral route. As the terminology suggests, this persuasion process occurs 
secondarily or indirectly, and usually when elaboration is relatively low. In this case, persuasion 
“occurs when motivation and/or ability are relatively low and attitudes are determined by 
positive or negative cues…which either become directly associated with the message position or 
permit a simple inference as to the validity of the message” (Petty and Cacioppo 132). Obviously 
in a courtroom setting, persuasion through the central route is ideal. To obtain this, however, one 
must determine the combinations of language and argument structure that produce the highest 
amount of elaboration.  
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Literature Review 
To understand how jurors make decisions, we must first evaluate how different factors of 
communication cause either central or peripheral persuasion to occur. We can begin to 
understand this by considering two questions: (1) how do different types of language effect the 
receiver’s ability to be persuaded and by what means, and (2) how do various argument types 
effect the receiver’s ability to be persuaded.  
How do different types and uses of language effect receiver persuasion? 
Types and uses of language can be defined by a range of terms, from syntax to verbal 
hesitations to explicit ideas. Lawrence A. Hosman, Thomas M. Huebner, and Susan A. Siltanen 
investigated the use of power language and conducted a study considering the effects of such 
language alongside ELM, hypothesizing that power-of-speech style, need for cognition, and 
argument quality on participant’s perceptions of a speaker would interact to affect cognitive 
responses and attitude toward the topic (361). The independent variables included argument 
strength and powerful vs. powerless speech style, as well as determining need for cognition prior 
to the study. As a manipulation, they inserted 15 to 16 hedges, hesitations, and tag questions into 
the powerless speech. The results revealed that the participants found, “low power-style [to 
indicate] significantly less control over others than a high-power style,” and “low-strength 
arguments [to be] perceived as less sociable than high-strength arguments” (Hosman, Huebner, 
and Siltanen 371). These findings show a direct, positive relationship between argument strength 
and power-of-speech style with one’s attitude toward the topic. However, it also became 
apparent that the positive thoughts about the speaker’s personal attributes generated by power-of-
speech style negatively affected one’s attitude toward the topic (Hosman, Huebner, and Siltanen 
374). The authors believe this could be due to listeners becoming concerned or threatened by a 
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speaker’s high-power style, an important implication for speaker style in a courtroom setting, 
and the reverse effects this style could have on a jury. 
Conducting a similar study prior to that of Hosman, Huebner, and Siltanen, John R. 
Sparks and Charles S. Areni found similar results involving this speech style. Sparks and Areni’s 
experiment applied ELM to determine how message style influences persuasion along with 
message substance. Although this study does not apply directly to a courtroom setting, the 
consideration of language power is an important factor to consider in law-based arguments.  In 
this study, the focus was placed on, “possible roles for language power under low and high levels 
of elaboration likelihood: as a peripheral cue, a biasing influence, and as an inhibiting influence” 
(Sparks and Areni 41). Powerless language was operationalized as containing nonverbal 
hesitations, verbal hesitations, deictic phrases, tag questions, hedges, and intensifiers, whereas 
powerful language exhibited a clear absence of such markers. Once again, data supported the 
idea that language power exerts a significant effect on attitude. Those exposed to powerless 
language expressed a more negative attitude toward the subject than those exposed to powerful 
language (Sparks and Areni 50). The data also strongly suggested that language power serves as 
a peripheral cue, and thus, “when message recipients were low in ability to cognitively respond 
to message arguments, powerless language negatively affected attitudes toward the advocated 
position” (Sparks and Areni 54). This is one of the most relevant findings in this study when 
considering jury persuasion, as in a situation where a jury member is unable to process an 
argument; the presence of powerless language may cause them to take a position against what is 
being advocated through the peripheral course of persuasion. 
 The actual words used, rather than how they are delivered, can also have a substantial 
effect on persuasive ability. One quality of information that determines its persuasive impact is 
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its vividness (“Vivid Persuasion” 659). Brad E. Bell and Elizabeth F. Loftus hypothesized that 
witnesses offering vivid testimony may be more persuasive than the same testimony offered in a 
pallid manner. They based this idea on the variables thought to mediate vividness, which they 
broke into, “three conceptually distinct categories: (1) inferential, (2) attentional/memorial, and 
(3) affective” (“Vivid Persuasion” 660). Additionally, they discovered that vividness influences 
inferences about the communicator’s credibility. The results of their study concluded that, 
“subjects determined the responsibility of the parties according to the relative credibility of the 
eyewitness, which in turn was determined by the relative vividness of the testimonies on each 
side” (“Vivid Persuasion” 660). Subjects explained that they believed an eyewitness had a better 
memory for what the culprit looked like if they gave a vivid testimony and offered several 
details. The implications of this study in determining the most persuasive testimony-related 
language style are explicitly stated by Bell and Loftus, in that, “vivid information presented at 
trials may garner more attention, recruit more additional information from memory, cause people 
to spend more time in thought, be more available in memory, be perceived as having a more 
credible source, and have a greater affective impact” (“Vivid Persuasion” 663).  
 A final consideration for the effect of language on persuasion impact is the use of 
language directed at the jury. Borrowing from ELM, Collin Richards Payne hypothesized that, 
“for jurors who like to think, strong plaintiff arguments will be strengthened and weak defense 
arguments will be weakened when both advocates include the variables of ‘personalized 
language’, ‘forewarning’ of an opposing advocate’s attempt to persuade, and no distractions” 
(310). By “jurors who like to think”, Payne is referring to those defined by Petty and Cacioppo 
as engaging in high-elaboration. Payne’s study found support for the idea that jurors who engage 
in this level of elaboration found strong plaintiff opening and closing arguments that included 
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‘personal language’ and a ‘forewarning’ of the weak defense’s attempt to persuade as beneficial 
for the plaintiff trial outcome (Payne 311). However, the results also indicated that this 
combination of jury interaction is beneficial except when the plaintiff objects to weak defense 
witness communication. Additionally, those participants that indicated having lower or higher 
education levels had a more difficult time distinguishing between strong and weak arguments 
than those who indicated having a moderate level of education. Payne’s study not only offers 
suggestions for the types of language an attorney should use when addressing the jury, but also 
offers insight as to the types of jurors an attorney would want to select for the highest possible 
amount of elaboration, and thus central route persuasion, to occur.  
How do various argument structures effect receiver persuasion? 
 Alongside language style and use, argument structure plays a key role in how receivers 
hear and then process an argument, and ultimately how the persuasive impact affects them. In a 
study by Neil Brewer and R.M. Hupfeld, mock juror’s judgments of witness effectiveness, 
probability that the defendant committed the crime, and verdict were examined in relation to the 
interaction of testimonial consistency and witness group identity (493). Brewer and Hupfeld 
found a strong relationship between witness effectiveness and testimonial consistency, with, 
“consistent testimony perceived as more effective than inconsistent testimony. For inconsistent 
testimony, witness effectiveness was perceived as relatively low” (503). Moreover, a consistent 
prosecution testimony resulted in a higher perceived probability that the defendant committed the 
crime, while inconsistent prosecution witnesses were judged as low in effectiveness, with the 
defendant considered unlikely to have committed the crime (Brewer and Hupfeld 506).  
This study also demonstrated key concepts established in the ELM framework. Heuristics 
come into play as a jury member who is unable to process the given information will often base 
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the credibility of a witness on their perceived likeness to the witness. Brewer and Hupfeld 
demonstrated this tendency, manipulating the witnesses so that the mock-jurors in their study 
rated themselves as closest to the designated in-group witness, less close to the designated 
neutral witness, and least close to the designated out-group witness. Further, in-group witnesses 
were perceived as more effective than out-group witness, with in-group witnesses with consistent 
testimony rating as highly effective (Brewer and Hupfeld 503).  
 Argument structure in terms of strong versus weak arguments can also determine the 
amount of elaborative thinking that takes place. H. Allen White brought together ELM and the 
third-person effect, which is the idea that one is expected to believe that others are more likely to 
be persuaded by an issue than they themselves are (558). White hypothesized that a message 
evaluated as being weak would be perceived by the participants as having a greater impact on 
others than the self, whereas a message evaluated as being strong would be perceived as having a 
greater impact on the self than on others (White 560). The results of the study conducted by 
White supported this hypothesis, which presents an interesting viewpoint when considering the 
makeup and role of a jury. Since a jury includes multiple people, the third-person effect would 
make reaching a consensus a challenging task, especially if jurors differ in their ability to 
distinguish strong or weak arguments. 
 The consideration of information surrounding the main argument presented forms a third 
argument structure.  In another study conducted by Brad E. Bell and Elizabeth F. Loftus, they 
present the idea of trivial persuasion, in which, “the minor details that a communicator reports 
might be as influential as information that has genuine significant value” (670). Thus, they go on 
to hypothesize that jurors may, “infer that the amount of detail reported reflects a witness’s 
memory for details…[and], in turn, reason that a witness who remembers details must have a 
Hopkins 10 
good memory for central objects” (“Trivial Persuasion” 670). The study found that participants 
were more likely to see the defendant as guilty when the prosecution offered a high amount of 
detail, as well as rating the defendant’s guilt in the direction of being guilty beyond doubt 
(“Trivial Persuasion” 670). The degree of detail in eyewitness testimony was found to have a 
reliable effect on judgments of guilt, and thus shows the persuasive effect of adding additional 
information to pad the main argument.  
 
Clearly, a number of studies have been conducted, many using the ELM framework, to 
determine various relationships between language style and use, argument structure, and social 
phenomena, and their persuasive impact on the general public. However, the majority of these 
studies solely consider witness testimonials, and have yet to fully examine opening and closing 
arguments presented by attorneys during trial. Thus, the aim of this experiment is to determine, 
in a courtroom setting, if presenting an opening argument with explicit language and a small 
amount of evidence is more or less effective in persuading the jury than presenting an opening 
argument using implicit language and a large amount of evidence. Will jurors side with a 
opening statement that is explicitly stated as it allows for less elaborative thinking, or will the 
elaborative thinking required by an implicit argument result in the juror also reaching the implied 
conclusion through high elaboration?  
Hypothesis 1: If the participants were to centrally make decisions, the arguments  
with the greatest amount of evidence should trump the alternative argument  
presented. Any Implicit or Evidential Explicit argument should be chosen as the  
correct side when paired with an Explicit argument.  
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Hypothesis 2: The perceived strength of evidence for either side, both individually  
and in comparison to the opposing side, will have a predictive effect on the guilty  
or not guilty verdict. Stronger evidence in favor of the prosecution will result in a guilty  
verdict, while stronger evidence in favor of the defense will result in a not guilty verdict. 
These aforementioned research questions and hypotheses were considered in the 
following pilot study. 
 
Method 
Design 
 This pilot study used a between-subject design, with each participant only receiving one 
of nine treatments. The independent variables are the type of argument presented (explicit or 
implicit) and the amount of evidence presented (minimal or a great deal). The dependent 
variables are defendant verdict (guilty or not guilty), how confident the participant feels about 
this verdict, and the number of subject–relevant thoughts produced by the participant.  
Materials 
To conduct this experiment, six versions of an opening statement of a fictitious court case 
were used. The opening statements were obtained from Stanford University’s Mock Trial 
program and were altered for the purpose of this study. The opening statements aligned with one 
of the following six conditions: Prosecution Explicit – explicitly stating that the defendant is 
guilty with minimal evidence, Prosecution Evidential Explicit – explicitly stating that the 
defendant is guilty with a great deal of evidence, Prosecution Implicit – a great deal of evidence 
presented against the defendant’s innocence but not explicitly stated, Defense Explicit – 
explicitly stating that defendant is innocent with minimal evidence, Defense Evidential Explicit – 
explicitly stating that defendant is innocent with a great deal of evidence, and Defense Implicit – 
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a great deal of evidence presented supporting the defendant’s innocence but not explicitly stated 
(see Appendix A). 
Sample 
The sample was made up of approximately 113 California Polytechnic State University, 
San Luis Obispo students, gathered from a total of five COMS 101 and 102 classes. These are 
lower-division, general education classes, and thus contained students from varying majors. As 
college students can be selected for jury duty, they represent a true sample of potential members 
of a courtroom jury. The sample contained 66 females and 47 males, ranging in age from 18 to 
22 years old (M = 19.14). The ethnic breakdown was as follows: 82.3% White (n = 93), 6.2% 
Asian (n = 7), 0.9% Hispanic/Latino (n =1), 8% multiracial (n = 9) and 2.7% other (n = 3). The 
sample was also asked to provide information as to their political affiliation: 32.7% Republican 
(n = 37), 31.9% Democrat (n = 36), 9.7% Independent (n = 11), 23% not interested in politics (n 
= 26), and 2.7% other (n = 3). Finally, the sample was also asked to identify with one of the 
following traits: 9.7% very liberal (n = 11), 31% somewhat liberal (n = 35), 35.4% 
moderate/middle of the road (n = 40), 19.5% somewhat conservative (n = 22), and 4.4% very 
conservative (n = 5).  
Procedure 
Two of the six conditions, or one of nine pairings, were randomly presented to each 
student. The treatment combinations were Prosecution Explicit + Defense Implicit (n = 19), 
Prosecution Implicit + Defense Explicit (n = 13), Prosecution Evidential Explicit + Defense 
Implicit (n = 13), Prosecution Implicit + Defense Evidential Explicit (n = 12), Prosecution 
Implicit + Defense Implicit (n = 11), Prosecution Explicit + Defense Evidential Explicit (n = 11), 
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Prosecution Evidential Explicit + Defense Evidential Explicit (n = 11), Prosecution Explicit + 
Defense Explicit (n = 11), and Prosecution Evidential Explicit + Defense Explicit (n = 12).  
Each student received a typed copy of the two opening statements they were randomly 
assigned, as well as a short survey (see Appendix B). They were instructed to read the two 
arguments, and then fill out the survey. The survey contained nine demographic related 
questions, two Likert-scale questions meant to gage whether they believe the defendant is guilty 
or innocent and how confident they are in their decision, and two short-answer questions meant 
to determine how the student came to their decision and the quality of the evidence in each 
statement, as well as an area for additional comments. This survey was meant to help determine 
whether their decision was made centrally or peripherally, as well as which argument conditions 
were the most persuasive. 
 
Results 
Quantitative 
 Hypothesis 1 investigated whether the conditional elements would predict a guilty or not 
guilty verdict. If the participants were to centrally make decisions, the arguments with a great 
deal of evidence should trump the alternative argument presented. For example, if one was 
presented with Prosecution Explicit + Defense Implicit or Prosecution Explicit + Defense 
Evidential Explicit, the participant should choose a not guilty verdict. Conversely, if the 
participant was presented with Prosecution Implicit + Defense Explicit or Prosecution Evidential 
Explicit + Defense Explicit, they should choose a guilty verdict. Unfortunately, this hypothesis 
was not significantly supported by the data gathered. A chi-square test was used to determine 
whether there was a significant difference between the condition and a guilty or not guilty 
verdict. The difference was not statistically significant, x2 = 17.63(16), p > .05. However, it is 
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worth looking at the variations in verdicts for the Prosecution Implicit + Defense Explicit 
condition. This condition produced 9 guilty verdicts and 4 not guilty verdicts, which aligns with 
the initial hypothesis made in this pilot study. 
Table 1. Condition x Guilty/Not Guilty Chi-Square Test 
 Value df Asymp. Sig. (2-
sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 17.623a 16 .346 
Likelihood Ratio 14.458 16 .565 
Linear-by-Linear Association .001 1 .979 
N of Valid Cases 113   
 
 
Unexpected results also came about for a number of conditions. The Prosecution Implicit 
+ Defense Implicit condition produced 3 guilty verdicts and 8 not guilty verdicts. Conversely, the 
Prosecution Explicit + Defense Evidential Explicit condition produced 8 guilty verdicts and 3 
not guilty verdicts. There are additional indications of this occurrence as the Prosecution Implicit 
+ Defense Explicit condition produced 9 guilty and 4 not guilty verdicts. This reveals that the 
prosecution argument was more likely to persuade the reader in conditions where the defense 
explicitly stated their position, with or without the existence of concrete evidence.  
Free Response 
The final research question presented in this study investigated the relationship between 
the perceived evidence strength and guilty or not guilty verdict. Hypothesis 2 stemmed from this 
question, stating that the conditions with an Implicit or Evidential Explicit argument paired with 
an Explicit argument should (a) be perceived to have a greater deal of evidence presented in the 
aforementioned conditions, and thus (b) receive more verdicts in favor of that side. A chi-square 
test was used to determine whether there was a significant difference between the perceived 
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evidence strength and a guilty or not guilty verdict. The difference was statistically significant, x2 
= 52.56(8), p < .001. 
 
 
Table 2. Guilty/Not Guilty Verdict x Perceived Evidence Strength Chi-
Square Test 
 Value df Asymp. Sig. (2-
sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 52.556a 8 .000 
Likelihood Ratio 49.677 8 .000 
Linear-by-Linear Association 2.022 1 .155 
N of Valid Cases 113   
 
 
Discussion  
 Although the expected differences between the conditions and guilty/not guilty verdicts 
were not significant, this pilot study offers a number of implications for argument structure and 
evidence use in courtroom opening arguments, as well as the types of processing that occur in 
such situations. 
From the data gathered, the number of arguments listed for or against the defendant by 
the participants ranged from one to six, with varying amounts of detail. Relating to Hypothesis 1, 
it was apparent that many participants referred back to the documents to gather reasons and to 
cite evidence, or lack thereof, presented by either side. The number range of arguments 
somewhat depended on the condition the participant received, but seemed to vary by individual 
participant as well. Although jurors are not presented with physical copies of attorneys’ opening 
statements as simulated in this study, they would hypothetically be provided with all evidence 
presented by both sides throughout the trial once it is time for deliberation to take place.  
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In relation to Hypothesis 2, Table 3 gives a breakdown of the participants’ verdicts in 
relation to the perceived strength of the evidence presented by either side. Of the 60 participants 
who found the defendant to be guilty, 48 explicitly stated that the prosecution had better 
evidence, 36 of whom also mentioned issues with the evidence and arguments presented by the 
defense. Of the 52 participants who found the defendant to be not guilty, 16 found the 
prosecution and defense evidence and arguments to be of equal strength, and 23 explicitly stated 
that the defense had better evidence. The large number of participants who voted not guilty and 
found evidence to be equal across the board presents an interesting area for consideration. 
Throughout the short answer responses given to the question of why or how they came to their 
decision, a number of participants cited the requirement of the prosecution in a court of law to 
prove that the defendant is guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.  For example, one participant who 
received the Prosecution Explicit + Defense Implicit condition cited the following as the 
reasoning for their not guilty verdict, “(1) There wasn’t conclusive evidence that it was for sure 
[the defendant], (2) she was not proven guilty, and innocence until proven guilty should be 
upheld, (3) evidence must be beyond reasonable doubt, and it was not.” Another participant 
presented similar reasoning, stating that, “the prosecution did not seem to have sufficient 
evidence to prove beyond reasonable doubt that the defendant was guilty.” Presumably, if the 
evidence on both sides is perceived as equal, the prosecution has not succeeded in this 
requirement. This is a positive implication for trial juries, as this provides potential, yet non-
conclusive, evidence that this is a concept highly elaborated on by jurors.  
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Table 3. Guilty/Not Guilty Verdict x Perceived Evidence Strength Crosstabulation 
Count   
 Evidence Strength Total 
Prosecution has 
better evidence 
Defense has 
better evidence 
Prosecution and 
Defense 
evidence equal 
Prosecution 
better, mentions 
issues w/ 
Defense 
Defense better, 
mentions issues 
w/ Prosecution 
 
Guilty 12 1 10 36 1 60 
Not Guilty 5 6 16 8 17 52 
                   
Total 
17 8 26 44 18 113 
 
 
The participants’ perceptions of evidence strength are also concurrent with the results of 
Bell and Loftus’ study on vivid persuasion. As previously discussed, Bell and Loftus found that 
“vivid” details were perceived as more credible, which then provided credibility for whomever 
was presenting the information. In the Implicit and Evidential Explicit arguments, the statements 
were manipulated to provide a large amount of vivid, concrete detail, and thus were often 
perceived as providing stronger evidence. These conditions also provided minor details, such as 
the plaintiff’s home address, a visual account of the plaintiff’s home after the police arrived, and 
the names of several secondary witnesses. Bell and Loftus also found evidence supporting the 
idea that the presence of minor details might be as influential as information with actual 
significant value. 
However, the findings discussed above were inhibited from being fully conclusive by a 
number of limitations. The most prevalent limitation throughout this pilot study was the sample 
size. Replications of this study would need at least triple the amount of participants per condition 
to receive any significant support for the given hypotheses. Although some of the data suggested 
a potentially significant relationship, the numbers were not enough to confidently produce 
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generalizable conclusions. Additionally, the population of Cal Poly, San Luis Obispo students 
that the sample was drawn from does not present a generalizable population for the implications 
of this study. With over 82% of the sample being White, middle or upper class college students, 
this study surveyed a very specific portion of the United States population, and possible jury 
members. The fact that all of the participants used are in the process of receiving a college 
education also sets them apart from the general population of the United States. Access to this 
specific population was also limited, as the number of COMS 101 and 102 professors who were 
able to conduct this experiment during class time was very restricted due to the time constraints 
of the quarter system. 
Additional limitations were presented by the measures used to collect the data. For 
example, the conditions were not checked for successful manipulation prior to administering the 
experiment, so the conditions could have not been distinguished enough in their specified 
category. The short answer questions also presented information that could have been coded in a 
number of different ways, and was not easily categorized. The data could be more consistent if 
these short answer questions were altered to require more specific quantitative and qualitative 
answers. Future research is necessary to revise this method of gathering subject-relevant 
thoughts.  
Prior research on this subject also brings forth future considerations for this study. As 
discussed earlier, Brewer and Hupfeld found significant effects of in-group and out-group 
behavior amongst mock jurors. Although their study explored this concept in relation to witness 
testimony, the findings can be generalized to the defendant. The defendant in this fictitious case 
is a middle-aged woman who is married. It would be difficult for most college students, such as 
those used in the sample, to relate directly to the defendant, and thus, she could potentially be 
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likened to an out-group witness. However, if the sample had been made up of married women, 
ages 30-50, the ability of the sample to relate to the defendant would be entirely different. 
Depending on the sample, the defendant could be likened to either an in-group or out-group 
witness, which could greatly affect the juror’s verdict. 
 
Conclusion 
The Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution secures citizens of the United States 
the right, among others, to an impartial jury. The amendment reads,  
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, 
by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have been 
committed, which district shall have been previously ascertained by law, and to be 
informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses 
against him; to have compulsory process for obtaining witness in his favor, and to have 
the Assistance of Counsel for his defense (US Const., amend. VI). 
Since trial by jury is an integral part of our legal system, continuous efforts should be made to try 
and improve upon the way juries make decisions and maintain impartiality. Although the court 
cannot fully control the language and argument structures attorney’s use in their statements 
throughout a trial, the court can work to train jury members in central decision-making and shed 
light on latent underhanded persuasive tactics being implemented by attorneys. This is especially 
important because in the most extreme cases, a jury can potentially determine whether another 
human being will live or die.  
Although jurors may believe they have an impartial stance in a trial, this study exposed 
persuasive methods, such as argument structure and use of language, which can be used by 
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attorneys to subconsciously sway a juror’s decision. Providing juries with a basic framework for 
how decision-making occurs in accordance with the elaboration likelihood model of persuasion, 
specifically the occurrence of peripheral and central decision-making, prior to the trial may allow 
for jurors to avoid the unintentional use of heuristics. The Constitution requires an impartial jury, 
and the entire judicial system would benefit greatly from an effort to produce a jury educated in 
the ways that their impartiality can be subconsciously impacted by statements of counsel during 
trial. Through the exploration of the positive and negative power that can result from the 
relationship between persuasion, language, and argumentation in a courtroom setting, we can 
continue to work towards producing the unbiased and trustworthy trial by jury system out 
forefathers envisioned.  
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Appendix A – Manipulations 
 
Prosecution Implicit (PI) Opening Statement  
 
 It’s October 20th, 2001 just after 11:00 pm at 2211 Botwin Drive, right here in Agrestic. 
Police cars, their lights still flashing, are parked along the street leading up to the house. Inside, 
police officers are securing the scene, dusting for fingerprints, searching for evidence. Standing 
in the corner speaking with a detective are Ryan and Sue Moore. They live at this address with 
their three children. And right now, in the bedroom where their thirteen-year-old daughter should 
be sleeping is a ransom note demanding a quarter of a million dollars for her return. 
 Now, the defense has already agreed that Mary Moore was taken from her home on the 
night of October 20th, 2001, meaning that as the prosecution we have one task: to reveal who 
took thirteen year-old Mary Moore from her room and left that ransom note in her place. Now, as 
the state, we have a responsibility to prove that to you beyond any reasonable doubt. And that is 
exactly what we will do. 
 Today you’ll learn that in October of 2001, the defendant, Jane Johnson’s, husband 
desperately needed money for a life-saving operation that cost least $250,000. That was money 
Jane Johnson did not have. And so you’ll discover that the defendant devised what she thought 
was the perfect plan: to kidnap Mary Moore and hold her for ransom. We’re here today because 
she could not conceal the evidence of her crime. 
 In fact, as today’s trial unfolds it will become clear that the following facts are not in 
dispute: 
 First, that Mary Moore’ kidnapper drugged her, using a powerful sedative called 
chloroandromine. Second, that Mary Moore was kidnapped between 8:30 and 11:00PM on the 
night of October 20. And third, that Mary Moore was confined by her kidnapper at the Hampton 
Hotel in Treeport. Today we will prove to you how each of those three facts points to the 
defendant’s guilt. 
 First, the drug – chlorandromine. The evidence will show that not only was that drug found 
on Mary Moore pillowcase and in her bloodstream; it was also found inside the defendant’s car. 
You’ll hear from the lead investigator in Mary’s kidnapping, Detective Dave Dunn, who will tell 
you that he searched the defendant’s car and found residue from the chemical chlorandromine on 
the defendant’s steering wheel and on both drivers’ side door handles. 
 Second, the time that Mary Moore was kidnapped. Today you’ll learn that the defendant 
was absent from her home for at least an hour during that same period. The defendant told the 
police that she only left her home to run an errand to the local liquor store. But today, you’ll hear 
today from the liquor store clerk, Rubin Rojas, who will tell you that his store is only twenty 
minutes from the defendant’s house, and that on the night October 20th she rushed into his store, 
cut another customer in line, and rushed out. Today you’ll learn that an errand that should only 
have taken 40-50 minutes took the defendant over an hour the night Mary was kidnapped. 
 Finally, the hotel where Mary Moore was found. You’ll hear from an employee who works 
at that hotel – Sarah Smith, who will explain how she found Mary Moore in the bathroom of 
room 312. Ms. Smith will explain that room 312 was rented under a false name, and that she saw 
Jane Johnson at the Hampton Hotel during the same weekend that Mary Moore was confined 
there. 
Three facts that are not in dispute. Three facts that clearly point to one conclusion and 
one culprit. A perfect plan – but carelessly concealed.  
Hopkins 22 
Prosecution Evidential Explicit (PEE) Opening Statement 
 
 It’s October 20th, 2001 just after 10:00 pm at 2211 Botwin Drive, right here in Agrestic. 
Flashing police cars are parked along the street leading up to the house. Inside, police officers are 
securing the scene, dusting for fingerprints, searching for evidence. Standing in the corner 
speaking with a detective are Ryan and Sue Moore. They live here with their three children. And 
right now, in the bedroom where their thirteen-year-old daughter should be sleeping is a ransom 
note demanding a quarter of a million dollars for her return. 
 Now, the defense has already agreed that thirteen-year-old Mary Moore was taken from her 
home on the night of October 20th, 2001, meaning that as the prosecution we have one task: to 
prove that it was the defendant, Jane Johnson, who took thirteen year-old child from her room 
and left that ransom note in her place. Now, as the state, we have a responsibility to prove that to 
you beyond any reasonable doubt. And that is exactly what we will do. 
 Today you’ll learn that in October of 2001, the defendant’s husband desperately needed 
money for a life-saving operation that cost least $250,000. That was money Jane Johnson did not 
have. And so you’ll discover that the defendant devised what she thought was the perfect plan: to 
kidnap Mary Moore and hold her for ransom. We’re here today because she could not conceal 
the evidence of her crime. 
 In fact, as today’s trial unfolds it will become clear that the following facts are not in 
dispute: 
 First, that Mary Moore’ kidnapper drugged her, using a powerful sedative called 
chloroandromine. Second, that Mary Moore was kidnapped between 8:30 and 11:00PM on the 
night of October 20. And third, that Mary Moore was confined by her kidnapper at the Hampton 
Hotel in Treeport. Today we will prove to you how each of those three facts points to the 
defendant’s guilt. 
 First, the drug – chlorandromine. The evidence will show that not only was that drug found 
on Mary Moore’s pillowcase and in her bloodstream; it was also found inside the defendant’s car. 
You’ll hear from the lead investigator in Mary’s kidnapping, Detective Dave Dunn, who will tell 
you that he searched the defendant’s car and found residue from the chemical chlorandromine on 
the defendant’s steering wheel and on both drivers’ side door handles. 
 Second, the time that Mary Moore was kidnapped. Today you’ll learn that the defendant 
was absent from her home for at least an hour during that same period. The defendant told the 
police that she only left her home to run an errand to the local liquor store. But today, you’ll hear 
today from the liquor store clerk, Rubin Rojas, who will tell you that his store is only twenty 
minutes from the defendant’s house, and that on the night October 20th she rushed into his store, 
cut another customer in line, and rushed out. Today you’ll learn that an errand that should only 
have taken 40-50 minutes took the defendant over an hour the night Mary was kidnapped. 
 Finally, the hotel where Mary Moore was found. You’ll hear from an employee who works 
at that hotel – Sarah Smith, who will explain how she found Mary Moore in the bathroom of 
room 312. Ms. Smith will explain that room 312 was rented under a false name, and that she saw 
Jane Johnson at the Hampton Hotel during the same weekend that Mary Moore was confined 
there. 
Three facts that are not in dispute. Three facts that will prove the defendant’s guilt. A 
perfect plan – but carelessly concealed. And that is why, at the conclusion of today’s trial we will 
ask you to find the defendant, Jane Johnson, guilty. 
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Prosecution Explicit (PE) Opening Statement 
 
 It’s night time on October 20th, 2001 at a house right here in town. Flashing police cars are 
parked along the street leading up to the house. Inside, police officers are securing the scene, 
dusting for fingerprints, searching for evidence. Standing in the corner speaking with a detective 
are Ryan and Sue Moore. They live here with their three children. And right now, in the bedroom 
where their thirteen-year-old daughter should be sleeping is a ransom note demanding a large 
amount of money for her return. 
 Now, the defense has already agreed that Mary Moore was taken from her home on this 
night, meaning that as the prosecution we have one task: to prove that it was the defendant, Jane 
Johnson, who took thirteen year-old Mary Moore from her room and left that ransom note in her 
place.  
 Today you’ll learn that in October of 2001, the defendant’s husband desperately needed 
money for a life-saving operation. That was money Jane Johnson did not have. And so you’ll 
discover that the defendant devised what she thought was the perfect plan: to kidnap Mary 
Moore and hold her for ransom. We’re here today because she could not conceal the evidence of 
her crime. 
 In fact, as today’s trial unfolds it will become clear that many facts are not in dispute: 
 First, that Mary Moore’ kidnapper drugged her, using a powerful sedative. Second, we 
know the timeframe in which Mary Moore was kidnapped was between 8:30 and 11:00PM on 
the night of October 20. And third, that Mary Moore was confined by her kidnapper at a hotel in 
a nearby town. Today you will see how each of those three facts points to the defendant’s guilt. 
 First, the drug. You will see that not only was that drug found on one of Mary Moore’s 
belongings and in her bloodstream; it was also found inside the defendant’s car. You’ll hear from 
the lead investigator in Mary’s kidnapping, who will tell you that he searched the defendant’s car 
and found residues on several parts of the interior of the car. 
 Second, the time that Mary Moore was kidnapped. Today you’ll learn that the defendant 
was absent from her home for at least an hour during that same period. The defendant told the 
police that she only left her home to run an errand to the local liquor store. But today, you’ll hear 
today from the liquor store clerk, who will tell you that his store is only twenty minutes from the 
defendant’s house, and that on the night of the kidnapping, she rushed into his store, cut another 
customer in line, and rushed out. Today you’ll learn that an errand that should only have taken a 
moderate amount of time took the defendant over an hour, providing a window of time to 
execute Mary’s kidnapping. 
 Finally, the hotel where Mary Moore was found. You’ll hear from an employee who works 
at that hotel, who will explain how she found Mary Moore in the bathroom of a hotel room. She 
will explain that room was rented under a false name, and that she saw Jane Johnson at the hotel 
during the same weekend that Mary Moore was confined there. 
These facts clearly point to one thing: the defendant’s guilt. A perfect plan – but 
carelessly concealed. And that is why, at the conclusion of today’s trial, we will ask you to find 
the defendant, Jane Johnson, guilty. 
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Defense Implicit (DI) Opening Statement 
 
 Someone. Someone kidnapped Mary Moore from her room. Someone held her captive for 
three days. That’s all we have, your honor, just someone. But that someone could be anyone. The 
prosecution’s case will leave a suspect without a motive, a crime without a witness, and a 
question without an answer: Someone kidnapped Mary Moore, but who? 
 Today, the Prosecution will have the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that 
Jane Johnson kidnapped Mary Moore on October 20, 2001.  
 As the facts are presented today, we won’t hear anything about a real motive. Jane Johnson 
will take the stand and explain that she is a caring mother, a devoted wife, and a loyal friend to 
the Moore’s. The Prosecution will claim that she was desperate enough to risk everything she 
loved. Jane Johnson will testify that four days before the kidnapping, she received another job 
offer, one that would pay for her husband’s surgery and, ladies and gentlemen, we will be left to 
question why Jane Johnson would have committed this crime in the first place. 
 But we can’t just question why, we must also question how. In order to meet its burden, the 
prosecution must prove that Jane Johnson entered the Moore’s home, dragged Mary Moore down 
a flight of stairs, and shoved her in her car without anyone noticing. They must prove that she 
carried a blindfolded, unconscious child to the third floor of a hotel without anyone seeing. And 
they must prove that she kept Mary Moore in that room for 3 days without leaving a trace of 
evidence behind. 
 We will also hear that someone was alone with Mary Moore, someone with access to the 
crime scene, someone who left prints all over room 312 where the victim was found. Who was 
that someone? The victim’s babysitter, Peyton Parker. Today, you’ll hear from Sarah Smith, the 
front desk manager of the Hampton Hotel. Ms. Smith will testify that Peyton Parker works at the 
hotel and has a key to room 312. Ms. Smith will reveal that she saw Peyton Parker at the hotel 
unexpectedly at the same time Mary Moore was missing. 
 Yet the evidence will show that the police failed to investigate Ms. Parker. Criminal 
Auditor Nick Nathanson, will tell us about the holes in the state’s investigation. Standard 
procedure disregarded. Physical evidence mishandled. And alternate suspects ignored. And while 
the state will focus on the evidence they saw, Mr. Nathanson’s testimony will beg the question: 
“just how much evidence did they overlook?” 
Sometimes it’s more important to look for what’s missing than to see what is already 
there. And so today we will ask you to consider everything the prosecution overlooked: A 
suspect without a motive, a crime without a witness, and a question without an answer. Someone 
kidnapped Mary Moore, but who? 
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Defense Evidential Explicit (DEE) Opening Statement 
 
 Someone. Someone kidnapped Mary Moore from her room. Someone held her captive for 
three days. That’s all we have, your honor, just someone. But that someone could be anyone and 
not Jane Johnson. The prosecution’s case will leave a suspect without a motive, a crime without 
a witness, and a question without an answer: Someone kidnapped Mary Moore, but who? 
 Today, the Prosecution will have the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that 
Jane Johnson kidnapped Mary Moore on October 20, 2001. But while the Prosecution will show 
that someone committed this crime, they will be unable to prove who, and it was certainly not 
Jane Johnson. 
 Because as the facts are presented today, we won’t hear anything about a real motive. Jane 
Johnson will take the stand and explain that she is a caring mother, a devoted wife, and a loyal 
friend to the Moore’s. And while the Prosecution will claim that she was desperate enough to 
risk everything she loved, the evidence will show otherwise. Jane Johnson will testify that four 
days before the kidnapping, she received another job offer, one that would pay for her husband’s 
surgery. Ladies and gentlemen, we will be left to question why Jane Johnson would have 
committed this crime in the first place. 
 But we can’t just question why, we must also question how. Because in order to meet its 
burden, the prosecution must prove that Jane Johnson entered the Moore’s home, dragged Mary 
Moore down a flight of stairs, and shoved her in her car without anyone noticing. They must 
prove that she carried a blindfolded, unconscious child to the third floor of a hotel without 
anyone seeing. And they must prove that she kept Mary Moore in that room for 3 days without 
leaving a trace of evidence behind. 
 But we will hear that someone was alone with Mary Moore, someone with access to the 
crime scene, someone who left prints all over room 312 where the victim was found. Who was 
that someone? The victim’s babysitter, Peyton Parker. Today, you’ll hear from Sarah Smith, the 
front desk manager of the Hampton Hotel. Ms. Smith will testify that Peyton Parker works at the 
hotel and has a key to room 312. Ms. Smith will reveal that she saw Peyton Parker at the hotel 
unexpectedly at the same time Mary Moore was missing. 
 Yet the evidence will show that the police failed to investigate Ms. Parker. Criminal 
Auditor Nick Nathanson, will tell us about the holes in the state’s investigation. Standard 
procedure disregarded. Physical evidence mishandled. And alternate suspects ignored. And while 
the state will focus on the evidence they saw, Mr. Nathanson’s testimony will beg the question: 
“just how much evidence did they overlook?” 
Because sometimes it’s more important to look for what’s missing than to see what is 
already there. And so today we will ask you to find Jane Johnson not guilty because of 
everything the prosecution overlooked: A suspect without a motive, a crime without a witness, 
and a question without an answer. Someone kidnapped Mary Moore, and it was not Jane Johnson. 
 
 
 
 
Hopkins 26 
Defense Explicit (DE) Opening Statement 
 
 Someone. Someone kidnapped Mary Moore from her room. Someone held her captive for 
three days. That’s all we have, your honor, just someone. But that someone could be anyone and 
not Jane Johnson. The prosecution’s case will leave a suspect without a motive, a crime without 
a witness, and a question without an answer: Someone kidnapped Mary Moore, but who? 
 Today, the Prosecution will have to prove that Jane Johnson kidnapped Mary Moore on 
October 20, 2001. But while the Prosecution will show that someone committed this crime, they 
will be unable to prove who. 
 Because as the facts are presented today, we won’t hear anything about a real motive. Jane 
Johnson will take the stand and explain that she is a caring mother, a devoted wife, and a loyal 
friend to the Moore’s. And while the Prosecution will claim that she was desperate enough to 
risk everything she loved, our testimonies will show otherwise. Jane Johnson will testify that 
four days before the kidnapping, she received another job offer, one that would pay for her 
husband’s surgery. Ladies and gentlemen, we will be left to question why Jane Johnson would 
have committed this crime in the first place. 
 But we can’t just question why, we must also question how. Because in order to meet its 
burden, the prosecution must prove that Jane Johnson entered the Moore’s home, dragged Mary 
Moore down a flight of stairs, and shoved her in her car without anyone noticing. They must 
prove that she carried a blindfolded, unconscious child to an upper floor of a hotel without 
anyone seeing. And they must prove that she kept Mary Moore in that room for several days 
without leaving a trace of evidence behind. 
 But we will hear that someone was alone with Mary Moore, someone with access to the 
crime scene, the victim’s babysitter. Today, you’ll hear from the front desk manager of the hotel 
where Mary was found. She will testify that the victim’s babysitter works at the hotel and has 
access to all rooms, and that she saw the victim’s babysitter at the hotel around same time Mary 
Moore was missing. 
 Yet the evidence will show that the police failed to investigate her. A criminal auditor will 
tell us about the holes in the state’s investigation. Standard procedure disregarded. Physical 
evidence mishandled. And alternate suspects ignored. And while the state will focus on the 
evidence they saw, the auditor’s testimony will beg the question: “just how much evidence did 
they overlook?” 
Because sometimes it’s more important to look for what’s missing than to see what is 
already there. And so today we will ask you to find Jane Johnson not guilty because of 
everything the prosecution overlooked: A suspect without a motive, a crime without a witness, 
and a question without an answer. Someone kidnapped Mary Moore, but who? 
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Appendix B 
 
Survey  
 
Section 1. Demographic information. 
 
1. Are you Male or Female? 
 
___ Male  
___ Female  
 
2. What is your age? 
 
___ 18  
___ 19  
___ 20  
___ 21  
___ 22+  
 
3. What is your racial/ethnic background? (Check more than one if applicable) 
 
___ White  
___ Black   
___ Asian  
___ Hispanic/Latino  
___ Other (Please specify) _______________   
 
4. What is your yearly household income?  
 
___ Less than $12,000   
___ $12,001-$30,000  
___ $30,001-$50,000   
___ $50,001-$100,000   
___ More than $100,001   
 
5. Which option best aligns with your political beliefs? 
 
___ I am a Republican   
___ I am a Democrat   
___ I am an Independent  
___ Other (Please specify) _______________   
___ I am not interested in politics   
 
6. In general, do you think of yourself as 
 
___ Very liberal   
Hopkins 28 
___ Somewhat liberal   
___ Moderate, middle of the road   
___ Somewhat conservative   
___ Very conservative   
 
7. Have you, or a family member, had an experience similar to the one described in the 
statements? 
___ Yes   
___ No   
 
8. Are any of your immediate family members attorneys, judges, etc.? 
___ Yes   
___ No   
 
9. How knowledgeable are you about the United States legal system? 
___ Very knowledgeable   
___ Somewhat knowledgeable   
___ Moderately knowledgeable on some aspects   
___ Not at all knowledgeable   
 
 
Section 2. Argument information. 
 
10. Based on the two opening arguments you have just read, do you believe the defendant, 
Jane Johnson, is: 
___ Guilty   
___ Not Guilty   
 
11. How confident are you in this ruling? 
___ Not at all confident   
___ Somewhat confident   
___ Moderately confident   
___ Very confident  
___ Entirely confident   
  
 
Section 3. Free response information. 
 
12. Why/how did you decide that the defendant was guilty/not guilty? (List reasons) 
 
 
13. How was the quality of the evidence in the prosecution argument? Compared to the 
defense argument? 
 
 
14. If you have any additional comments about this questionnaire, please write them here: 
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